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ABSTRACT
The risk of receiving cell-phone spam—in the form of unsolicited
text messages—grows as advertisers increasingly target cell-phone users.
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) clearly
prohibits unsolicited telephone calls made by an automated telephone
dialing system (ATDS) without the recipient’s express prior consent.
But until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Satterfield v. Simon &
Schuster, it was unclear how TCPA applied to text messages. Simon
& Schuster argued their text messages were not “calls” under the
TCPA and were not sent by an ATDS. The Ninth Circuit disagreed
and held a text message is a “call.” The court also held an ATDS
means any equipment with capacity to store or dial random or
sequential telephone numbers, regardless of whether such calls were
actually made. This sweeping rule arguably applies to any computer.
The court also adopted narrow legal definitions of “brand” and
“affiliate” that could hinder any business seeking third-party
advertisers to send messages on its behalf. This Article explores how
Satterfield exposes mobile advertisers to significantly increased liability.
*
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INTRODUCTION
In 2004 Laci Satterfield downloaded a free ringtone for her eightyear-old son’s cell phone from www.nextones.com.1 Two years later
publishing giant Simon & Schuster launched an advertising campaign
using text messages to promote Stephen King’s latest horror novel,
Cell. 2 The company outsourced the advertising to ipsh!, Inc. (ipsh!), a
mobile marketing firm with 100,000 cell-phone numbers purchased
from various Web sites including Nextones.3
At half-past midnight on January 18, 2006, Satterfield’s son

1

Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2009); Brief
for Defendants-Apellees at 4., Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946
(9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-16356), 2007 WL 4856754.
2
Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Stephen King Tries to Ring Up Book Sales, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 23, 2006, at B1. (King’s book is about a supernatural force transforming the
world’s cell-phone users into flesh-eating zombies.) See Janet Maslin, Invasion of
the Ring Tone Snatchers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at E1 available at http://www.ny
times.com/2006/01/23/books/23masl.html.
3
Before downloading the ringtone, Satterfield had checked a box next to the
following statement: “Yes! I would like to receive promotions from Nextones affiliates and brands. Please note, that by declining you may not be eligible for our FREE
content. By checking Submit, you agree that you have read and agreed to the Terms
and Conditions.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, 569 F.3d at 949.
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received Simon & Schuster’s text-message advertisement:
The next call you take may be your last . . . Join the
Stephen King VIP Mobile Club at www.cellthebook.
com. RplySTOP2OptOut. PwdbyNexton.4
The message terrified the young boy. Satterfield wrote “STOP” in
response. Then she sued Simon & Schuster and ipsh!5 for sending an
unsolicited text-message advertisement in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).6 She later sought to certify
a class of 60,000 people who received similar messages.7
Simon & Schuster moved for summary judgment by arguing:
TCPA did not apply because text messages were not “calls,” the
messages were not sent by a prohibited ATDS, and Satterfield
consented to receive promotions from Nextones affiliates and brands.8
The district court ruled for Simon & Schuster.9 But the Ninth Circuit
reversed and held: (1) a text message is a “call” under TCPA; (2) an
ATDS is any equipment with capacity to store, produce, or call
random or sequential numbers; and (3) Simon & Schuster was not an
“affiliate” or “brand” of Nextones and therefore Satterfield did not
consent to receive the text-message advertising.10 The decision
reinstated Satterfield’s effort to certify a $90-million class action
lawsuit.11
This Article will describe the laws regulating text-message
4

Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 949.
Corrected Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 1, Satterfield v.
Simon & Schuster, Inc., No. C 06-2893 CW (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2007), 2006 WL
1787153, rev’d, 569 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009).
6
47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006) et seq.
7
First Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief,
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., No. 406CV02893 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2009),
2009 WL 3441944; 9th Cir. Hangs Up on Text Message Spam, 16 No. 7 ANDREWS
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 23 (Aug. 19, 2009).
8
Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 950.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 951, 952, 955.
11
9th Cir. Hangs Up on Text Message Spam, 16 No. 7 ANDREWS CLASS ACTION
LITIG. REP. 23 (Aug. 19, 2009).
5
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advertising and will explore how Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster exposes
mobile advertisers to liability under TCPA. In particular, the court’s
broad definition of a prohibited ATDS—any computer with capacity to
generate random numbers—may further restrict text-message marketing. The court’s definitions of “affiliate” and “brand” may also discourage the use of plain language in terms and conditions displayed to
consumers visiting Web sites.
I. TEXT-MESSAGE ADVERTISING AND MOBILE SPAM PREVALENCE
Text messaging, or short message service (SMS), allows cell-phone
users to send and receive 160-character text-only messages.12 Carriers
charge per text message or offer monthly flat rates.13 SMS supports
sending messages phone-to-phone or Internet-to-phone.14 Phone-tophone messages are directed to cell-phone numbers. Internet-to-phone
messaging allows users to send their message to an e-mail address assigned by the wireless carrier; the carrier then converts this e-mail into
a text message.15
Text messaging is big business. In 2008 American cell-phone users
sent an average of seven billion text messages per month, up 20
percent from 2007.16 The mobile advertising market, including text12

The European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) first developed
an SMS technical standard in the early 1990s. Today the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) develops and maintains an SMS standard inter-nationally. See
3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Realization of Short Message Service
(SMS), Technical Report 3GPP TS 23.040, http://www.3g pp.org/specificationnumbering (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
13
Steven Masur & John Maher, Mobile Phone Text Message Spam: Building A
Vibrant Market for Mobile Advertising While Keeping Customers Happy, 7 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L. J. 41, 44-45 (2007).
14
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Co., 121 P.3d 831, 837-38 (2005).
15
Every cell-phone number has an e-mail address that is typically the user’s cellphone number and the wireless carrier’s domain address. For example, the AT&T
cell-phone number (783) 836-5464 would have an e-mail address: 7838365464@att.
wireless.net. E-mails sent to that address would be converted to text message and
then delivered to the user’s cell phone. See Joffe, 121 P.3d at 837-38.
16
Liz Farmer, Conn.-based Vesta Mobile hoping u r ready 4 txt msg mrktng, DAILY
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message marketing, is projected to be worth $12 billion by 2011.17 Text
messaging is now more popular than cell phone calls.18
A broad range of technology providers are involved in creating,
processing, and distributing text-message advertising.19 In Satterfield, for
example, five companies accessed Satterfield’s phone number before
she received the text-message advertisement.20 In an effort to selfregulate, more than 600 carriers, advertisers, manufacturers, and software providers formed the Mobile Marketing Association (MMA) in
2000 to issue voluntary best practices guidelines for the mobile
advertising industry.21
Despite these efforts, private lawsuits alleging spam text messaging
(also known as wireless spam, cellular spam, mobile spam or m-spam)
REC. (Baltimore), Mar. 27, 2008, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_qn4183/is_20080327/ai_n24975493.
17
Susan Moore, Gartner Says Telecom Carriers Are Well Placed to Win Advertising
Revenue if They Overcome Key Challenges, GARTNER NEWSROOM, Aug. 26, 2008,
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=747112.
18
Priya Ganapati, Texting Finally More Popular Than Calling Among U.S. Mobile
Users, WIRED, Sep. 22, 2008, http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2008/09/us-finallycatc/.
19
Linda A. Goldstein, Mobile Advertising and Web 2.0, 962 PRAC. L. INST./PAT.
315, 324 (2009); see also MOBILE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, UNDERSTANDING
MOBILE MARKETING: TECHNOLOGY & REACH (May 2007), available at http://
www.mmaglobal.com/uploads/MMAMobileMarketing102.pdf.
20
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 950 (9th Cir. 2009).
First, Nextones sold customer phone numbers to MIA. MIA then sold those
numbers to ipsh!, the mobile advertising company Simon & Schuster hired.
Employees at ipsh! wrote the text messages for Simon & Schuster and converted
them to a file format deliverable to wireless carriers. Those files—embedded with telephone numbers—were sent to mBlox, a mobile transaction networking service
company or “aggregator.” (Aggregators combine, on one network, all direct communications to wireless carriers.) mBlox transmitted the messages to carriers that
routed them to customers. See generally Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit Revives TCPA
Claim--Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG,
July 3, 2009, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/07/ninth_circuit _r.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
21
MOBILE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, U.S. CONSUMER BEST PRACTICES
GUIDELINES VERSION 5.0 (June 1, 2010), http://www.mmaglobal.com/bestpractices.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
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continue to target mobile advertisers.22 American cell-phone users
received 1.5 billion spam messages in 2008—a 37 percent increase from
the 1.1 billion messages received in 2007.23
II. HOW SATTERFIELD RESTRICTS MOBILE ADVERTISING
Two federal laws regulate text-message advertising: (1) TCPA24 and
its FCC regulations25; and (2) the Controlling the Assault of NonSolicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM)26 and its FCC
regulations.27 TCPA permits private lawsuits28 and does not preempt
state anti-spam laws.29 In contrast, CAN-SPAM generally prohibits
private lawsuits30 and preempts most state law.31 Satterfield ultimately
22

Jack Gordon, FDCPA and Other Consumer Rights Lawsuit Statistics, WEBRECON
LLC, Jan. 7, 2010, http://webrecon.com/news/?p=131; Bridget M. O’Neill, Wireless
Spam This Way Comes: An Analysis of the Spread of Wireless Spam and Proposed Measures
to Stop It, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 229 (2003).
23
Richi Jennings, SMS Text Message Spam is a Minor Problem, FERRIS RESEARCH
BLOG, July 14, 2008, http://www.ferris.com/2008/07/14/sms-text-message-spam-is-aminor-problem/. Jennings argues U.S. cell-phone spam is still rare relative to other
countries; approximately one-third of one percent of total U.S. messages were spam
in 2007. But cell-phone spam has become a significant problem internationally. For
example, 200 million Chinese cell-phone users received spam text messages in 2008.
Beijing Investigates Spam Attack, BBC WORLD NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2
/hi/business/7311242.stm (March 24, 2008); see also Terrence O’Brien, Text-Message
Spam Continues to Grow Around the World, SWITCHED, May 4, 2009, http://www.
switched.com/2009/05/04/text-message-spam-continues-to-grow-around-the-world/.
24
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
25
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2010).
26
15 U.S.C. § 7712(b) (2006).
27
47 C.F.R. § 64.3100 (2010).
28
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006).
29
47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (2006); see, e.g., Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 2006 ND
84, 712 N.W.2d 828.
30
FTC is vested with primary enforcement authority. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(a)
(2006). State attorneys general also have civil enforcement power. 15 U.S.C.
§ 7706(f)(1). And Internet providers may bring civil actions. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g). See
generally, Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575 F.3d 1040, 1048 (2009).
31
Decisions interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b) have found no preemption when
the state law does not expressly regulate spam. See, e.g., Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575

2010]

MOBILE MARKETING DERAILED

39

rested its decision on TCPA. The court held a text message is a call
under TCPA, equipment sending the message is prohibited if it has
the capacity to dial randomly or sequentially, and consent to receive
messages from an “affiliate” or “brand” is limited to corporate relationships based on ownership or control.32 This holding will likely make
lawful mobile advertising more difficult for businesses.
A. Text Messages Are Calls Under TCPA
TCPA prohibits “any call . . . using any [ATDS] . . . to any telephone number assigned to . . . a cellular telephone service . . .” unless
the recipient gave prior express consent.33 TCPA does not define
“call.” Satterfield affirmed a 2003 FCC determination that “call” means
“both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers, including, for
example, short messages service (SMS) calls . . .”34 While previous
judicial decisions had reached similar conclusions, Satterfield is the first
opinion to conduct a Chevron/Mead35 analysis determining the
F.3d 1040, 1060-64 (2009); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469
F.3d 348 (2006) (pre-empting only causes of action for immaterial misrepresentation,
not falsity sounding in tort). In other words, CAN-SPAM does not preempt state laws
prohibiting “falsity or deception.” See generally Katherine Wong, The Future of Spam
Litigation After Omega World Travel v. Mummagraphics, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 459,
469-72 (2007).
32
Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 950; see generally The Complex Litigator, In Satterfield
v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., Ninth Circuit defers to FCC and construes
text messages as “calls” under TCPA, June 22, 2009, http://www.thecomplexlitiga
tor.com/post-data/2009/6/22/in-satterfield-v-simon-schuster-inc-ninth-circuit-defersto.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
33
47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2010).
34
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14115 ¶ 165, 2003 WL 21517853 (2003)
(Report and Order); see also Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 19 F.C.C.R. 15927, 15934 (2004) (confirming
“prohibition on using [ATDS] to make calls to wireless phone numbers applies to
text messages . . . as well as voice calls.”).
35
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); see generally Evan J.
Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U.L. REV. 1271 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr.
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appropriate level of deference to give the FCC opinion.36
Before Satterfield, defendants had argued messages sent Internet-tophone (e-mails converted into text messages) were not calls and
therefore CAN-SPAM applied and prevented private lawsuits. For
example in Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., the defendant argued TCPA
did not apply because text messages were first e-mailed. But the Joffe
Court rejected that argument and held TCPA also applies to text
messages originally sent by e-mail: “[w]hether a text message is sent
phone-to-phone or Internet-to-phone, the end result is the same.”37
Satterfield affirmed this prohibition on Internet-to-phone messages
also applies to text messages sent phone-to-phone. In part, Satterfield
relied on the FCC’s determination that “it is unlawful to make any call
using an [ATDS] . . . to any wireless telephone number . . . . This
encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including,
for example, short message service . . .”38 Joffe had cited the same FCC
order, but had not conducted a Chevron/Mead analysis regarding the
appropriate level of deference.39 Satterfield is therefore the first decision
to do so.
First, Satterfield determined Congress intended an ordinary
meaning of “to call”: “to communicate or try to get into communication with a person by telephone.”40 The court also noted the purpose
& Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamden, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
36
Two other decisions have followed Satterfield to affirm text messages are calls
under TCPA. Abbas v. Selling Source, LLC, No. 09 CV 3413, 2009 WL 4884471
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009) (reaching the same conclusion without Chevron deference);
Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 09-CV-6344, 2010 WL 1197884
(N.D. Ill Mar. 23, 2010) (deferring to the FCC’s 2003 opinion).
37
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Co., 121 P.3d 831, 838 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
38
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14115 (2003)) (emphasis added).
39
Joffe, 121 P.3d at 837 n.6.
40
Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 318 (2002)); accord Joffe, 121 P.3d at 835 (noting “when the word call is
used as a verb, one of its most common meanings is to communicate or try to
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of TCPA was to prohibit “communicat[ing] with others by telephone
in a manner that would be an invasion of privacy” and “a voice
message or a text message are not distinguishable in terms of being an
invasion of privacy.”41 Next, the court found the FCC’s interpretation
of “call” reasonable because it was consistent with the dictionary
definition “that text messaging is a form of communication used
primarily between telephones.”42 Applying Chevron, the court deferred
to the FCC’s interpretation and therefore held a text message is a
“call” under TCPA.43
The court’s holding, that a text message is a call under TCPA, may
increase the likelihood of mobile advertisers being found liable for
text-message spam, but those following best practices guidelines should
not be significantly affected.44 In particular, guidelines from MMA
already prohibit sending unsolicited messages, require that consumers
affirmatively opt-in, and mandate that all messages contain directions
on how to opt-out.45 Moreover, selling mobile opt-in lists is
prohibited.46 In sum, although text messages are now clearly calls, the
best practices guidelines are largely consistent with TCPA rules
governing such calls for advertising purposes.

communicate with by tele-phone.”). While other courts have subsequently agreed a
“text message” is a “call,” the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is somewhat problematic. In
particular, the court relied on the verb form “to call” (“to communicate with or try to
get into communi-cation . . . by a telephone”), but TCPA clearly uses “call” as a
noun—“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make any call . . . using any [ATDS] . .
.” Compare Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954 with 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis
added).
41
Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
William B. Baker & Scott D. Delacourt, Important Mobile Marketing
Decision by the Ninth Circuit, http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=art
icles &id=5271 (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
45
See GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 13-14, 16.
46
Id. at 16.
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B. ATDS Means “Capacity” to Dial Randomly or Sequentially
TCPA prohibits using an ATDS to call any cellular telephone
service without express prior consent. Satterfield is the first circuit court
decision construing the definition of an ATDS under TCPA. Based on
the statute’s text, the court interpreted ATDS very broadly:
“equipment which has the capacity to both (1) store or produce
numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator
and (2) to dial such numbers.”47
Such a broad definition poses a serious challenge to mobile advertisers because all computers arguably have the capacity to generate
random numbers. Therefore, under Satterfield, a large portion of
mobile marketers are potentially at risk. In response, advertisers
formed the Mobile Advocacy Coalition (MAC) to lobby the FCC to
protect underlying technology providers from liability based on
Satterfield’s new definition of ATDS.48 Although the FCC’s 2003
opinion49 suggested any capacity would be sufficient to render
equipment an ATDS, such a broad interpretation might not be
47

Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 949 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (2006); 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200(f)(1) (2010)) (emphasis added). The district court had held TCPA did not
apply because Simon & Schuster’s messages were sent to a targeted list of numbers
and therefore not randomly generated. But Satterfield found the district court had
focused on the wrong issue: “[A] system need not actually store, produce, or call
randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers, it need only have the
capacity to do it.” Id. at 951.
48
Mobile Advocacy Coalition, Mobile Marketing: What’s At Stake & What
We’re Doing About It, http://www.mobileac.org/2009/06/mobile-advocacycoalition.html (June 24, 2009, 1:59 PM EST). MAC plans to petition the FCC for an
exemption from liability as “mere conduits” of advertising. This would amount to a
finding that the “sender,” for TCPA liability purposes, is the user of the mass texting
technology rather than the underlying technology provider. There is precedent for
such exemptions: the FCC exempted carriers and fax broadcasters from liability as
mere conduits. Cf. Portuguese Am. Leadership Council of the U.S., Inc. v. Investors’
Alert, Inc., 956 A.2d 671 (2008); Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 94 N.Y.2d 242
(1999).
49
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14091-93, 2003 WL 21517853 (2003).
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entitled to deference without formal notice-and-comment
rulemaking.50 Nevertheless, MAC’s plans are nascent and therefore
advertisers who have relied on their equipment not being an ATDS
under TCPA should review their practices in light of Satterfield.
One issue the Ninth Circuit did not reach was whether the
equipment used to send the message to Satterfield actually dialed
Satterfield’s number within the meaning of TCPA. TCPA does not
define the word “dial.”51 The Joffe court had interpreted “dial” to mean
“operate or manipulate a device in order to make or establish a
telephone call or connection.”52 Joffe therefore concluded sending
Internet-to-phone text messages was dialing because “[e]ven though
Acacia used an attenuated method to dial a cellular telephone number,
it nevertheless did so.”53 Advertisers using computers to send messages
might consider raising this issue in an effort to mitigate Satterfield’s
focus on capacity to dial random or sequential numbers.

50

“An agency interpretation must be preceded by some minimum of process to
merit deference; simple agency pronouncements, opinion letters, and policy
statements fall below that minimum.” Abbas v. Selling Source, LLC, No. 09 CV
3413 at *12, 2009 WL 4884471 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009) (citing Krzalic v. Republic
Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 2002)). The FCC’s original notice of proposed
rulemaking only requested comments “on the various technologies used to dial
telephone numbers . . . and whether an autodialer can generate phone calls from a
database of existing numbers.” In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 17459, 17474, 2002 WL 31084939
(Sept. 18, 2002). This notice arguably did not request comment on whether all
systems with capacity to dial randomly or sequentially should be considered an
ATDS. Therefore, to the extent the 2003 FCC opinion spoke to this issue, it may
have done so without process.
51
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(B) (2006).
52
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Co., 121 P.3d 831, 838 n.10 (2005) (citing
WEBSTER’S NINTH COLLEGIATE 349 (1990)) (internal quotations omitted).
53
Id. at 839. For a criticism of this view see J. Wesley Harned, Telemarketers Gone
Mobile: The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 and Unsolicited Commercial Text
Messages, 97 KY. L. J. 313, 330 (2009) (arguing text messages may not fall under
TCPA because sending them does not involve dialing).
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C. “Affiliate” and “Brand” Defined Narrowly by Ownership and Control
When Satterfield downloaded the ringtone onto her son’s cell
phone, she consented to receive “promotions from Nextones affiliates
and brands.”54 Satterfield held that Simon & Schuster was not an
“affiliate” or “brand” of Nextones and therefore Satterfield did not
consent to the text-message advertising. The court’s interpretations of “affiliate” and “brand” impose narrow legal definitions on
these terms that undermine the move to jargon-free Web site disclosures.
Simon & Schuster argued the various agreements between
Nextones, MIA, and ipsh! permitted advertising to Satterfield. In
particular, Nextones had licensed its subscribers’ telephone numbers,
including Satter-field’s, to MIA. MIA then sold the numbers to ipsh!,
Simon & Schuster’s advertiser.55 When ipsh! sent the message with the
tag line “PwdbyNexton,” this was an attempt to label the advertisement
as a Nextones message. Simon & Schuster argued it was therefore an
affiliate of Nextones and was authorized to send the message:
Thus, although Nextones shares no corporate structure
with [Simon & Schuster] and is not a corporate
“affiliate” in a strict legal sense, [Simon & Schuster]
submit that the fact that Nextones licensed its
subscriber list for use in this campaign constitutes the
requisite degree of affiliation . . .56
The court rejected this plain reading of “affiliate”—a meaning often
employed in online terms and conditions in an effort to simplify
language for consumers.57 Instead, Satterfield appears to have imposed
54

Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2009).
See supra note 20.
56
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Satterfield v. Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 2893, (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2007) (No. 062893 CW), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35856.
57
See generally Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through Agreements: Strategies for
Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401, 410 (2001) (explaining
terms should be clear and readable); accord FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DOT
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technical definitions of “affiliate” and “brand” taken from corporate
governance and trademark law.58
First, the Ninth Circuit found “[t]he term affiliate carries its own
independent legal significance . . . [it] refers to a corporation that is
related to another corporation by shareholding or other means of
control . . .”59 The court therefore held Simon & Schuster was not an
affiliate of Nextones because Nextones neither owned nor controlled
Simon & Schuster.60 Second, the court imposed an equally technical
definition of “brands” as “goods identified as being . . . of a single
firm.”61 Satterfield did not consent on this basis either because the text
message advertised a Simon & Schuster product, not a Nextones
product. Furthermore, adding “PwdbyNexton” to the message did not
transform Simon & Schuster into a Nextones affiliate or brand.62
The court’s decision to impose technical definitions on terms and
conditions may seriously restrict future efforts to conduct mobile
advertising campaigns.63 For example, it is unclear how companies
COM DISCLOSURES 14 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecom
merce/bus41.pdf (recommending clear language and syntax and avoiding legalese or
technical jargon to make disclosures effective and understandable to consumers);
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK 3
(1998) available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf.
58
See Goldman, supra note 20.
59
Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 955 (quoting Delaware Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Christiana
Care Health Servs., Inc., 892 A.2d 1073, 1077 (Del. 2006) (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 59 (7th ed. 1999))) (internal quotations omitted).
60
Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 955.
61
Id. at 955 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 268
(2002)).
62
Id. (“Nextones’s only role in this case was simply supplying the numbers to
MIA, who in turn supplied the numbers to ipsh! The record also shows no agreement between Nextones and Simon & Schuster.”).
63
Ronnie London, Has The 9th Circuit Raised The Bar For Text-Message Affiliate
Marketing? PRIVACY & SECURITY LAW BLOG, June 24, 2009, http://www.privsecb
log.com/2009/06/articles/main-topics/marketing-consumer-privacy/has-the-9thcircuit-raised-the-bar-for-textmessage-affiliate-marketing/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
For criticism of the lack of uniformity in privacy policies see Robert Sprague &
Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through
Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 124-33 (2009)
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should now identify a third party on their Web site who markets to
their customers; describing third parties as “affiliates” will no longer
suffice. Moreover, companies can no longer insulate themselves from
TCPA liability by stamping messages with the signature of the
company that obtained the customer’s consent.64
This decision also raises significant questions as to what constitutes
adequate consent to receive messages. Under MMA best practices,
Nextones would have been responsible for collecting user consent to
receive promotions, and MIA would have been responsible for using
that data in accordance with MMA guidelines.65 These guidelines for
affiliate marketing would also have required Simon & Schuster be
identified in the message and in opt-out language.66 It remains unclear,
however, whether such disclosures are still sufficient after Satterfield.
CONCLUSION
Satterfield held unsolicited text messages sent by an ATDS are
unlawful under TCPA because: (1) text messages are calls; (2) the
system sending the messages is an ATDS if it has the capacity to
generate numbers randomly or sequentially; and (3) the terms “affiliate” and “brand,” when used in online terms and conditions, are
defined narrowly.
The court’s definition of an ATDS presents a serious challenge to
advertisers because all computers arguably have the capacity to generate
random numbers. Furthermore, the decision’s narrow, technical
definitions of “affiliate” and “brand” are troublesome because they
may discourage plain language in online terms and conditions and
make it difficult for future companies to hire third-party marketing

(exploring collection and dissemination of personal identifying information and
determining there is little regulation of online privacy policies).
64
London, supra note 63.
65
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Satterfield v. Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 2893, (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2007) (No. 062893 CW), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35856; GUIDELINES, supra note 21.
66
GUIDELINES, supra note 21.
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companies. Marketers using third-party lists of telephone numbers
must therefore continue to obtain the appropriate warranties, covenants, and indemnity provisions regarding how the numbers were
collected, whether the third party is permitted to disclose the numbers,
and the ability of marketers obtaining those numbers to use them. And
companies hiring third-party marketing companies must ensure the
customers who opted-in actually consented to receive text messages.
PRACTICE POINTERS


When seeking consent from customers, ensure terms and conditions identify exactly what the customer will receive and who will
send it. Eschew the use of any terms that have vague or ambiguous
meanings such as “brand” or “affiliate” in favor of more precise
terms such as “third parties.”



Do not send text messages to customers who did not expressly consent to receive messages.



Identify all companies that have access to a customer’s phone
number and ensure each has complied with any restrictions on the
customer’s express consent.



Vendors providing lists of phone numbers to marketers that will
use the numbers to send text messages should ensure appropriate
contractual terms and conditions govern the marketers’ uses.



Marketers that obtain phone numbers from vendors should negotiate appropriate representations, warranties, and indemnities
regarding the scope of consent that vendors obtained from
consumers.

